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POLYCYCLIC GROUPS:
A NEW PLATFORM FOR CRYPTOLOGY?
BETTINA EICK AND DELARAM KAHROBAEI
Abstract. We propose a new cryptosystem based on polycyclic groups. The cryptosys-
tem is based on the fact that the word problem can be solved effectively in polycyclic
groups, while the known solutions to the conjugacy problem are far less efficient.
1. Introduction
Key exchange problems are of central interest in cryptology. The basic aim is that two
people who can only communicate via an insecure channel want to find a common secret
key. There are many approaches available which try to solve this problem. The most
classical of these is perhaps the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange.
Key exchange methods are usually based on one-way functions; that is, functions which
are easy to compute, while their inverses are difficult to determine. Here ’easy’ and
’difficult’ can mean that the complexities or the practicality of the methods are far away
from each other; ideally, the one-way function has a polynomial complexity and its inverse
has an exponential complexity.
Many of the known one-way functions have a common problem: it is often easy to find
a one-way function with a polynomial complexity, but showing that there is no inverse
function with similar complexity or practicality is usually the difficult part of the project,
since the best inverse function might just not have been discovered yet. Hence it is of
interest to investigate new one-way functions.
Here we propose a new one-way using similar ideas as in the Arithmetica key exchange
[1]; that is, our one-way function is based on the word problem and the conjugacy problem
in certain non-commutative groups.
The novelty in our approach is that we propose to use polycyclic groups as a basis for
the protocols: These groups are a natural generalisation of cyclic groups, but they are
much more complex in their structure than cyclic groups. Hence their algorithmic theory
is more difficult and thus it seems promising to investigate classes of polycyclic groups as
candidates to have a more substantial platform perhaps more secure.
2. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is both the original public-key idea and an important
mechanism in current use. The practical point is that symmetric ciphers are generally
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much faster than asymmetric ones (both hardware and software reasons), so the public-
key cipher is merely used to set up a private key, a session key, intended to be used only
for a single conversation. This protocol is based on the discrete logarithm, and it uses the
relative difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. Originally, it was based on the Z/p
discrete-logarithm, but it also generalizes to arbitrary finite fields, elliptic curves, or to any
algebraic structure where logarithms make sense. We recall the classical idea of the Diffie-
Hellman scheme as follows; see [8]: First, Alice, and Bob agree on a large prime m, and a
primitive root g modulo m. These need not be kept secret and can be shared by a group
of users. Alice chooses a large random integer x, privately computes X = gx mod m, and
sends X to Bob by the possible insecure channel. Meanwhile, Bob similarly chooses a
large random integer y, privately computes Y = gy mod m, and sends Y to Alice across
the possible insecure channel. Then Alice privately computes k = Y x mod m, and Bob
symmetrically computes k′ = Xy mod m. Then k = k′ mod m, as
k′ = Xy = (gx)y = gxy = (gy)x = k mod m,
and thus k = k′ is the common secret of Alice and Bob. But no one else on the network
can determine k, unless they can compute discrete logarithms.
3. Key exchange based on non-commutative groups
In 1999, the Arithmetica key exchange [1] was introduced by Anshel, Anshel and Gold-
feld. It intends to achieve the same effect as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange; that is, it
establishes a shared secret when the only communication possible is across an insecure
channel. By contrast with Diffie-Hellman, it is based on combinatorial group theoretic
properties and it uses non-commutative groups such as braid groups, making use of the
difference of the complexity of the word and the conjugacy problem in such groups; see
[11].
Since then, the area of ’group-theoretic cryptosystems’ has been very active. For ex-
ample, Bridson and Howie [4] have considered hyperbolic groups as a basis for a group-
theoretic cryptosystem. Also, Gebhardt [9] describes a fast algorithm to check conjugacy
in certain braid groups indicating that braid groups may not provide a secure basis for
cryptosystems. A class of groups which provides a provably secure basis for the Arith-
metica key exchange seems not to be known so far.
Below we recall two public key exchange methods: the Arithmetica key exchange [1]
and a version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange for non-commutative groups. We use
these two key exchange methods as a basis for the remainder of this paper. We refer to
[1] for their application to braid groups.
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3.1. Arithmetica key exchange. Let G be a finitely generated group with solvable word
problem. Let S and T be two finitely generated subgroups of G and let {s1, · · · , sn} and
{t1, · · · , tm} be generating sets for S and T , respectively. Note that here x
y stands for
y−1xy. Now suppose two people, Alice and Bob, want to agree on a key. The group G,
its subgroups S and T and their generators are public information. Then
a) Alice chooses a secret element a ∈ S as a word in the generators a = sa1i1 · · · s
al
il
and publishes ta1, . . . , t
a
m.
b) Bob chooses a secret element b ∈ T as a word in the generators b = tb1i1 · · · t
bh
ih
and
publishes sb1, . . . , s
b
n.
Based on this setup, Alice and Bob can use [a, b] as a shared secret. It is straightforward
to observe that both, Alice and Bob, can compute [a, b] readily, since
[a, b] = (b−1)ab = ((tai1)
b1 · · · (taih)
bh)−1 · b computable for Bob
= a−1ab = a−1 · (sbi1)
a1 · · · (sbil)
al computable for Alice
However, to determine [a, b] based on the published data, we have to compute a and b,
respectively. These can be determined by solving the conjugacy problem and finding an
element which conjugates ti on t
a
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and an element which conjugates sj on
sbj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Thus the conjugacy problem can be used to break this cryptosystem.
3.2. Non-commutative Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Let G be a non-abelian group
with solvable word problem. Let u ∈ G and let S and T be two subgroups of G such that
[S, T ] = {1}. Suppose that two people, Alice and Bob, want to agree on a key. The group
G, its element u and its subgroups S and T are public information. Then
a) Alice chooses a secret element w ∈ S and publishes uw.
b) Bob chooses a secret element v ∈ T and publishes uv.
If w and v commute, then Alice and Bob can use uwv = uvw as a shared secret. This is
straightforward to determine for Alice and Bob based on their secret data. The determi-
nation of the shared secret is less easy if only the public data is available. In this case the
conjugacy problem can be used to determine w and v from u and uw and uv.
4. Polycyclic groups for cryptosystems
In this section we consider the use of polycyclic groups as a basis for the key exchange
methods as described above. Recall that a group is called polycyclic if there exists a
polycyclic series through the group; that is, a subnormal series of finite length with cyclic
factors. There are two different natural representations for these groups which can be
used for computations: polycyclic presentations and matrix groups over the integers. We
consider these two representations in the following.
4.1. Polycyclic presentations. Every polycyclic group has a finite presentation which
exhibits the polycyclic structure of the considered group: a polycyclic presentation of the
form
〈a1, . . . , an | a
ai
j = wij, a
a−1i
j = vij , a
rk
k = ukk for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and k ∈ I〉
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where I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and ri ∈ N if i ∈ I and the right hand sides wij , vij , ujj of the
relations are words in the generators aj+1, . . . , an. Using induction, it is straightforward
to show that every element in the group defined by this presentation can be written in the
form ae1
1
· · · aenn with ei ∈ Z and 0 ≤ ei < ri if i ∈ I.
A polycyclic presentation is called consistent if every element in the group defined by
the presentation can be represented uniquely by a word of the form ae1
1
· · · aenn with ei ∈ Z
and 0 ≤ ei < ri if i ∈ I. In this case these words are called normal words. We note that
every polycyclic group has a consistent polycyclic presentation and these presentations are
frequently used as a basis for computations with polycyclic groups. We refer to [14] for
background and a more detailed introduction to polycyclic presentations.
4.1.1. The word problem. The word problem in a consistent polycyclic presentation can
be solved effectively using the so-called collection algorithm, see [14]. This algorithm
computes the unique normal word for an arbitrary word in the generators. The basic idea
of the collection algorithm is that it applies iteratedly the power and conjugate relations
of the given presentation to subwords of a given word and thus it modifies the given word.
The nature of the relations asserts that an iteration of this process will eventually produce a
normal word. The efficiency of the collection algorithm depends critically on the sequence
of chosen subwords which are processed. There are various strategies which have been
investigated for this purpose. We refer to [12] and [10] for an analysis of strategies in finite
polycyclic groups and in [9] for arbitrary polycyclic groups. The resulting complexities
of the methods depend on the growth of the exponents ej of generators gij occurring in
intermediate stages of the algorithm while processing the word ge1i1 · · · g
el
il
. This growth
can be bounded above if the considered group is finite. In infinite polycyclic groups
there is the potential risk of an integer explosion inherent in the collection algorithm. In
praxis, collection is known as an effective method to solve the word problem in consistent
polycyclic presentations. The method is implemented in GAP [15] and MAGMA [3] and
it has proved to be practical for finite and infinite polycyclic groups.
4.1.2. The multiple conjugacy problem. The Arithmetica key exchange can be broken if
an effective algorithm to determine a multiple conjugating element a with rai = si for
1 ≤ i ≤ m can be found (knowing that such an element exists). We observe that this
problem reduces to the single conjugacy problem as follows.
Let a1 be an element with r
a1
1
= s1 and let G1 = CG(s1). Then every element a ∈ G
with ra1 = s1 can be written as a = a1c with c ∈ G1.
By induction, suppose that an element aj is given with r
aj
k = sk for 1 ≤ k ≤ j and let
Gj = CGj−1(sj) = CG(s1, . . . , sj). Then every element a ∈ G with r
a
i = si for all i is of
the form a = ajc with c ∈ Gj . Compute c ∈ Gj with (r
aj
j+1)
c = sj+1 and, simultaneously,
determine Gj+1 = CGj(sj+1). Now define aj+1 = ajc as the element for the next step.
Iterating this process yields an element a = am eventually.
As every centralizer Gj is a subgroup of G, an induced polycyclic presentation for Gj
can be computed from a generating set. Thus the multiple conjugacy problem reduces to
m applications of the single conjugacy problem with a simultaneous determination of the
corresponding centralizers.
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4.1.3. The single conjugacy problem. The non-commutative Diffie-Hellmann key exchange
and the Arithmetica key exchange can be broken if an effective algorithm to determine
a conjugating element ra = s for given r, s ∈ G can be found. For the Arithmetica key
exchange the additional computation of CG(s) is necessary.
In [2] has been proved that there exists an algorithm to compute such a conjugating
element and such a centralizer in a polycyclic group. Later, in [7] another algorithm for this
purpose has been described. The algorithm of [7] has been implemented in the Polycyclic
package [6] based on GAP and Kant [5] and its performance has been investigated. It can
be observed that the algorithm is practical on interesting examples, but its performance
is far less good than the performance of the collection algorithm. In particular, in large
polycyclic groups with a complex structure, the computation of conjugating elements is
practically impossible while the word problem is still effectively solvable.
The algorithm described in [7] uses induction down along a normal series with elemen-
tary or free abelian factors of the considered group G. The steps corresponding to finite
factors in the series can be solved by an application of an orbit-stabilizer algorithm as
typical for finite groups.
The steps corresponding to infinite factors require:
a) Methods from representation theory such as the computation of submodule series,
b) Methods from algebraic number theory such as the computation of unit groups,
c) Methods from finite polycyclic groups such as the finite orbit-stabilizer algorithm.
A determination of the complexity of the conjugacy algorithm has not been attempted
yet. However, the complexity of this algorithm could incorporate the complexity of the
unit group computation in algebraic number fields and in this case it is going to be far
away from the complexity of the word problem. This seems to suggest that polycyclic
groups are a promising candidate for cryptosystems.
4.2. Matrix representations. Every polycyclic group can be described as a finitely
generated subgroup of GL(d,Z) for some d ∈ N. In this setting, the word problem for a
polycyclic group is solvable in polynomial time, as matrix multiplication for such groups
is solvable in polynomial time.
The conjugacy problem has not been considered for polycyclic matrix groups so far.
The only implemented method to solve the multiple or single conjugacy problem in such
groups is by determining a polycyclic presentation and then applying the method of [7].
However, there is a possibility that linear methods can be used to compute conjugating
elements or to improve the above approach, even though such methods have not been
studied yet.
5. Examples
In this section we consider a few examples of polycyclic groups and we investigate the
practicality of the collection algorithm and the conjugacy algorithm of [7]. This will yield
the observation that not every class of polycyclic will be useful as a basis for a cryptosystem
as outlined above, but there are classes which look promising.
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5.1. Some example computations. Let K = Q[x]/(f) be an algebraic number field for
a cyclotomic polynomial fw, where w is a primitive r-th root of unity. Then deg(fw) =
ϕ(n). The maximal order O of K is a ring whose additive group is isomorphic to Zn and
the unit group U of K is a finitely generated abelian group. The natural split extension
G(w) = O ⋊ U is a metabelian polycyclic group and we investigate a few examples of
such groups and the practicality of their word and conjugacy problem in the following
tables. For this purpose, we list the order r of w, the Hirsch length h(G(w)) of G(w),
the average time used for 100 applications of the collection algorithm on random words
and the average time used for 100 applications of the conjugacy algorithm on random
conjugates in such groups.
r h(G(w)) coll conj
3 2 0.00 sec 9.96 sec
4 2 0.00 sec 9.37 sec
7 6 0.01 sec 10.16 sec
11 14 0.05 sec > 100 hrs
For the prime 11, the result of a single conjugacy test could not be computed within
one hour using the current methods. For primes larger than 11, the results of such timing
are expected to be even worse.
5.2. Nilpotent groups. For finitely generated nilpotent groups there are various special
methods known to compute with these groups. For example, the word problem in finitely
generated nilpotent groups can be solved by evaluating polynomials as described in [13].
The conjugacy problem can be solved by an efficient methods as for example described in
[14].
In this case the complexity and the practicality of the conjugacy problem is perhaps
not as far away from the complexity of the word problem as in the case of an arbitrary
polycyclic group.
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